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SOME COMMENTS ON THE EXPANDING
DEFINITION OF "SECURITY"*
JAMES S. MOFSKY**
The securities industry is in the midst of a crucial period. A sig-
nificant number of securities dealers have crumbled in a market beset
with complex problems, while the remaining firms have, for the most
part, reported lower profits or losses. One wonders when the next old-
line dealer will shut its doors. Even a young billionaire (now only a
millionaire) could not-through the application of advanced computer
technology concepts to the securities business-rescue one of Wall Street's
oldest and largest firms; recently, he sold off the firm's assets, attempt-
ing to cut his losses (estimated in excess of $100 million). At the same
time, as if grasping for a panacea, debate has raged among government
regulators, stock exchange representatives, legal writers and others over
such matters as fixed commissions, a central market, and increased
periodic disclosure. Fundamental changes are occurring at such a rapid
pace that it is difficult to foretell with any certainty the shape of the
markets of tomorrow. But the effects of some proposals and changes can
be predicted, and, unfortunately, they do not augur well for the small
entrepreneur. A case in point is the recent expansion of the definition of
"security" to include a whole variety of financing devices that, until
lately, were never regarded as subject to the restrictions imposed by the
securities laws.
A threshold question to securities lawyers and their clients is whether
a particular scheme of financing will be deemed a security. If so, it is
subject to the costly registration provisions of the law if offered for sale
but not exempt from registration. Even if exempt, the antifraud provi-
sions of the laws may be applicable to a transaction involving the pur-
chase or sale of a security. Federal and state securities laws impose
severe civil and criminal sanctions for failure to comply with their regis-
tration provisions, and the antifraud elements of the laws have become
so diluted that it is often difficult to determine in advance the kind of
actions or utterances that will spell liability.
The definition of "security" is not fundamental only to such basic
matters as registration and the applicability of the antifraud provisions.
Indeed, it relates in obscure ways to matters never contemplated by
legislators and regulators when the laws were enacted or rules adopted.
* The purpose of this article is to provide a conceptual framework for an understand-
ing of the expanding definition of a security and should be read in conjunction with the
following article by Tew & Freedman.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami. The author appreciates the comments of
Michael Press, third-year law student and member of the Editorial Board of the University
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For example, who would have thought that certain condominium offerings
would be subject to the margin and credit restrictions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Federal Reserve Board Regulation T? Yet,
depending upon the manner of their offering, condominium units may be
deemed securities, and, in certain circumstances, arrangements for mort-
gage financing of them by their developers may be subject to such
margin and credit restrictions-an impediment to the marketing of con-
dominiums that was clearly never intended and, arguably, highly un-
desirable. Similarly, if a particular investment is deemed a security, its
holder, depending upon the amount of that investment relative to other
assets of the holder and depending on certain other factors, may become
an inadvertent investment company and thus become subject to the regis-
tration and other restrictions contained in the Investment Company
Act of 1940.
These few examples illustrate the significance of this central con-
sideration-whether a particular financing or investment technique is a
security. If so, it is regulated in a variety of ways that increase dra-
matically the costs of its promotion and sale. Those costs may pose
entry barriers that some businessmen will be unwilling or unable to
bear; and, if fewer persons engage in a particular business activity
because of these regulatory costs, we often find undesirable social conse-
quences such as competitive advantages that accrue to larger, more
established firms to whom the regulatory costs are not too burdensome.
Additionally, the larger firms that are able or willing to pay those
regulatory costs often pass them on to investors or purchasers of the
firms' products or services, thus in turn raising the costs of investments
and other goods.
When Congress and the state legislatures enacted the securities laws,
those regulatory costs were traded off in favor of the presumed benefits
of "investor protection." Recent scholarship has cast grave doubts on
the notion that such benefits outweigh the accompanying costs. Accord-
ingly, the very philosophy underlying the securities laws is being ques-
tioned, and there is a growing body of empirical evidence that securities
regulation is more harmful than beneficial to society. It is ironic that at
such a time an increasing number of financing devices are being labeled
by the courts and regulators as securities and thus subjected to costs
that may on balance be creating highly detrimental economic conse-
quences. It is particularly noteworthy, and unfortunate, that this expan-
sion of the definition of "security" has been directed primarily at devices
(such as the franchises) that have not been commonly regarded as
securities and that often provide small investors with opportunities-
perhaps one of their last opportunities-of participating in their own
enterprises.
The problem is not with such standard instruments as stocks, bonds,
debentures, or notes, for they are readily identifiable as securities. Rather,
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the difficulty arises with the more ingenious devices that do not clearly
come within the purview of the orthodox terminology. To be more
specific, the problem stems from the way courts and regulators define
the terms "investment contract," "certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement," and "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security." Those catchall interests are uniformly
included in the federal and state definitions of "security," and depend-
ing on the content given to those terms, a financing plan may or may
not be regarded as a security.
The catchall terms were placed in the statutes to cover those situa-
tions where a financing plan has the main attributes of a stock or bond
offering but were either labeled with a unique name or structured in
such a manner that they would technically avoid traditional categoriza-
tion and thus escape the registration, antifraud and other provisions of
the laws. However, it was no small task to choose catchall terms that
were sufficiently narrow to embody the principal elements of stocks and
bonds but also broad enough to encompass an ingenious scheme that was
virtually identical to those investment forms but called by some other
name. Given this problem in legislative draftsmanship, the framers of
state and federal securities statutes opted for extremely broad catchall
terms, leaving the courts with great flexibility to create standards and
limitations as cases arose. The high degree of discretion delegated to
the courts has resulted in a remarkable proliferation of cases, many with
varying definitions of "investment contract" and others with practically
no visible standards at all. Thus, as the standards are judicially changed
and as the courts apply the catchall terms without giving them con-
ceptual content, lawyers and their clients are often left with the dilemma
of guessing whether a particular plan of financing will be deemed a
security.
The process all began in 1917 when the Minnesota Legislature incor-
porated the term "investment contract" in its statute defining "security."1
That term, along with the other well-known catchall terms, ultimately
spread throughout the states and was adopted by Congress when it
enacted the federal securities laws. Considering the literal meaning of
the words "investment" and "contract," any contractual arrangement
whereby capital was employed to produce income or profit could have
been found by the courts to constitute a security. And since capital can
take many different economic forms including human capital as well as
money or tangible assets, the offer of employment contracts coupled with
the expectation of income or profit for the person contributing his human
resources could literally amount to an investment contract and, conse-
quently, a security. Indeed, in the first case defining the term, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 1920, recognized the economic meaning
of "investment" when it said: "No case has been called to our attention
1. Mnrw. GEN. L., ch. 429, § 3 (1917).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
defining the term 'investment contract.' The placing of capital or laying
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment is an investment as that word is commonly used and
understood."
2
Initially, that broad definition often appeared without elaboration
in court decisions, although, in fact, the courts did not apply it strictly
to all factual situations. In refraining from a literal application, the
courts were in effect recognizing the enormous regulatory burden and cost
to society that would result from subjecting all contractual arrangements
involving investments to the securities laws. Thus, very early, the courts
recognized the policy question of where to draw the line. Almost at the
outset, they placed the cut-off point where the investor was actively
involved in the concern. Accordingly, contracts which contemplated a
purely passive role by the investor were held to constitute securities while
those which anticipated active participation by the investor were deemed
not to involve securities. This conclusion was a realistic approach, since
the purpose underlying the securities laws was to protect investors. If the
investor were actively engaged in the operations from which he derived
his profit, he could protect himself; on the other hand, the passive
investor was not in a position to look after his own interests and thus
needed the protection afforded by the securities laws.
Moreover, this passivity element was also at the heart of most stock
and bond offerings. Thus, by analogy, an investment contract which
contemplated a purely passive role by the investor was not, stripped
of its form, essentially different in substance from more traditional
securities. In addition to the limited liability factor, a principal reason
for the development of the corporate form was its inherent quality of
centralized management accompanied by its ability to raise capital from
a large number of investors who would not participate in management
decisions. Except to the extent that shareholders elected directors and
voted on certain organic corporate changes, stockholders and bondholders
as such had little control over the policies of the firm. It was not until
much later that, for tax and other reasons, the close corporation devel-
oped (where there is often an identity of interest between the investment
and management functions). The principal motivation of stock and bond
investors, except in some close corporation situations, was, and still is,
a return or profit based upon the decisions of other persons-the man-
agers. Thus, it is apparent that the passivity element is typical and
central to the stock or bond interest. To the extent that stock- or bond-
holders may also be managers, their management function is different
from their function as capital contributors; the distinction between
entrepreneurial, capital-contributing, and management activities has long
been recognized in economic theory as well as in practice.
In establishing the elements of "investment contracts" and other
2. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920).
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catchall securities, we have observed that the early courts had substantial
basis for drawing the line as indicated in the above analysis. The next
step was for the courts to translate their policy decision into a formula.
Ultimately, that was done, and in the landmark case of SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.,8 the United States Supreme Court spelled out a threefold
test that signified "investment contract": (1) An investment of money
in (2) a common enterprise and (3) profits to come solely through the
efforts of others. That formula illustrates nicely how the courts cut
back from the economic realities underlying investments generally and
defined investment contracts in terms that were analogous to the typical
bond or stock offering. For example, the Supreme Court test is geared
to an investment of money and is not based on the investment of other
forms of capital. Additionally, the Supreme Court definition contemplates
passivity on the part of the investors, since their investment of money
must be made with the expectation that they would earn a profit "solely
through the efforts of the promoter or someone other than themselves."
The Howey test has not been free from interpretive difficulties. For
example, there remained problems such as defining "common enterprise"
and determining whether a nominal or token participation was sufficient
to overcome the solely standard. But the courts were able to resolve
these issues, and lawyers were provided with guidelines with which they
could predict, without great difficulty, whether a particular financing
plan involved a "common enterprise." Furthermore, courts have held
that mere token participation by the investor would not preclude ap-
plication of the securities laws. When these interpretations were com-
bined with the Howey formula, determination of whether a particular
scheme involved a security became, for the most part, a mechanical
matter. But as courts, regulators, and legal writers sought expansion of
the catchall definitions, that mechanical quality of the Howey formula
began to create serious conceptual problems. This phenomenon was not
unique to the area of securities regulation. Courts and regulators, for
policy reasons, have often decided to extend or contract the reach of
some legal principle; and such decisions have required reversal of posi-
tion or development of new rationale to justify the policy change. But
when the United States Supreme Court has established the legal principle
or when the principle has existed for an extensive period, it is obviously
indelicate, not to mention reversible error, for lower courts to hold
contrary to the established maxim. Accordingly, such courts, and regu-
lators administering a body of law, have attempted to circumvent a
direct confrontation with a particular principle by developing new
rationale. That is exactly what has happened with respect to the defini-
tion of "security."
One theory offered to justify expansion of the catchall definitions is
called "risk capital." Actually courts, regulators and damaged investors
3. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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have not been able to agree upon a single "risk capital" test. Accordingly,
several varieties of "risk capital" have been developed, all spawned
by policy determinations that the securities laws should extend to new
business or financing devices. Although several federal courts have toyed
with the concept, it is really a creature of state law, given birth by the
Supreme Court of California in connection with that court's attempt to
define "security" for purposes of California law. In the seminal case,4
the term was used throughout the court's opinion, but it was never
defined. However in that case, it was obvious that the entire scheme was
extremely speculative in view of the small capital contribution by the
promoters. Such riskiness was probably the crucial factor in the court's
policy determination. And in the cases that have followed California's
lead, "risk capital" has been employed where the promoters' investment
is small relative to the needs of the particular businesses and where there
is a high degree of risk to the outside contributors of capital.
In such situations, most of the requisite capital is raised from out-
side persons who do not generally participate in the management of the
promoter's operations. For example, in the case of some multi-level dis-
tributorships, the promoter selling distributorships may seek to raise
most of his capital from distributorship purchasers who earn a profit
only if they (the distributorship purchasers) actively sell a product or
service. But that purchaser may have no control over the managerial
decisions of the promoter. Similarly, in the case of the typical franchise,
the franchisee earns a profit only if he actively engages in the sale of a
bucket of chicken or some other product. Yet in most franchise situa-
tions, the franchisee is given no authority to participate in the franchisor's
policy formulation. In some such franchise operations, virtually all of
the franchisor's necessary capital is raised through the sale of franchises.
In those situations, it is essentially the proceeds derived from franchise
sales that are risked to promote the franchisor's business and, in effect,
the total enterprise (including the individual franchisee outlets). The
risk extends to the total enterprise, since the success of the franchisor and
franchisee are inextricably related. Speculativeness of a franchise opera-
tion is particularly high with respect to initial franchise purchasers who
may be providing the promotor's seed capital before the viability of the
particular franchise concept is proven.
The Howey formula cannot be applied literally to the foregoing fact
patterns, inasmuch as the investors (franchisees and distributorship
purchasers) earn a return based, at least to some extent, on their own
efforts. That test is inapplicable, unless we are prepared to conclude
that the word "solely" need not be taken at face value. Several state
courts, in adopting the "risk capital" concept, have coupled that con-
cept with a diluted passivity element carried over from Howey. For
4. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d
906 (1961).
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example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided that an investment con-
tract was created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror;
(2) A portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of
the enterprise;
(3) The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the
offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some
kind, and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree
as a result of the operation of the enterprise; and
(4) The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the
enterprise.5
Thus, the Hawaii court combined the risk capital approach with a
modification of the Howey standards. First of all, the Hawaii court
recognized the economic reality that an investment may exist even if the
offeree contributed capital other than money; accordingly, the court
talked about the investor's contribution using the general term "value."
Furthermore, with respect to the passivity question, the court eliminated
the element of solely through the efforts of others and replaced it with
an absence of practical and actual control over the managerial decisions
of the enterprise.
Other state courts, coming to grips specifically with the franchise
or distributorship question, have also adopted standards designed, for
policy reasons, to regulate those special situations. For example, an
Idaho court said that a security would be present if the following could
be found:
(1) a common enterprise,
(2) expectation of monetary profit or some other benefit and
(3) either (a) nonparticipation or (b) a double-investment
situation where there is a contribution of risk capital, as
well as nonparticipation in the franchisor's separate busi-
ness.6
As the courts sought to escape the narrowness of the Howey formula,
they offered rationale for a more general test. But when one moves from
specific to new, general propositions, one always increases the likelihood
of conceptual and practical problems. For example, does "risk capital"
mean the initial capital required to promote and finance a totally new
venture? Or, does it mean the capital necessary to finance a risky (un-
proven) venture, regardless of the stage of its development? Finally,
could it mean capital invested with less than a "fair" chance of return?
5. State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 649, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (1971).
6. State v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLUE Sxy L. REP. f 71,023, at 67,201
(Idaho 4th Dist. 1972).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
The importance of how we define "risk capital" is thus readily
apparent. If it means initial capital, then we would observe the stage of
development of a venture and the amount of capital supplied by the
promoters compared to the amount necessary to make it economically
feasible. If there is a vast disparity between the amount of capital in-
vested by the promoter and the amount sought from franchisees or pur-
chasers of distributorships, then the arrangement would be deemed to
involve "risk capital." However, if "risk capital" means continuing
capital-that is, capital necessary to finance an existing but unproven
or risky business-the fact finder would first determine whether the
business was an existing one, and then it would be necessary to ascertain
when the business was sufficiently proven (lacking in risk) so that the
capital contributed by franchisees and purchasers of distributorships
would no longer come within this definition of "risk capital." The factual
determinations to be made under either definition could be difficult, but
the task involved with the concept of continuing "risk capital" could be
especially troublesome. Moreover, we must recognize the reality that
courts will invariably be judging "risk capital" with the benefit of hind-
sight. How then can a lawyer safely advise his client with respect to the
amount of promoter's contribution, whether initial or continuing, neces-
sary to escape the hazards of a "risk capital" trap?
The variety of ways in which risk capital (initial or continuing) can
be combined with diluted passivity (no control over the franchisor's
management decisions) has led to several different definitions of the
catchall terms. That in turn has generated increased uncertainty regard-
ing the meaning of "security." But uncertainty is not the only high cost
created for entrepreneurs by virtue of expanding the definition of
"security." Other significant costs include the inefficiencies and practical
difficulties that underlie some of the new concepts. To be specific, the
so-called "two-tier" or "double-level" analysis of franchise agreements
amply illustrates these latter costs.
The proponents of the two-tier analysis argue that, on one level, the
franchisee's investment is in his own business for which he purchases
equipment, realty, leases, inventory, labor, and all other assets necessary
to operate the business. On the second level, it is maintained that the
franchisee also invests in a separate business, that of the franchisor. His
investment in the franchisor's operation may be through an initial
franchise fee, monthly or yearly franchise payments, payment for services
or inventory to be rendered or sold by the franchisor to the franchisee,
or through other means such as rebates or overrides. The common-
enterprise aspect of the total franchise arrangement lies in the fact
that: (a) franchisees are contributing franchise payments that are
often used as the initial or continuing capital to commence or support
the franchisor's operations, and (b) franchisees' profits are related to
and depend, in varying degrees, on the sound management and success
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of the franchisor's operations, over which individual franchisees gen-
erally have no control.
It has been argued that this second level of investment in the
franchisor's operations is itself a security. The Idaho decision, previously
cited, made specific reference to this "double-level" or "two-tier" aspect
of franchise agreements. Under this concept, it would be necessary to
grant franchisees some amount of managerial control over the franchisor's
separate business for the second-level to escape being deemed a security.
Yet it is not difficult to imagine the managerial chaos that would result
from such planning. For example, how much managerial control is
enough? Over what substantive matters must the franchisees have con-
trol? And how will the franchisees exercise managerial control-at per-
haps something like a town meeting where they can all gather, voice
their comments, and ultimately vote in a democratic fashion? We may
seriously wonder if there are many entrepreneurs who, as franchisors,
would invest their resources in such arrangements. Of course, entrepre-
neurs could avoid these problems by simply registering the franchises.
That course of action raises the specter of all the economic costs as-
sociated with securities law compliance. Firms like McDonalds would not
be affected adversely. Indeed, the larger franchisors would have a com-
petitive advantage over some smaller operations for whom the marginal
costs of compliance might exceed the marginal benefits. Thus, we could
predict adverse social consequences in the form of diminished competition.
In analyzing this area of franchises and multi-level distributorships,
the courts and regulators overlook an important point regarding man-
agerial control. That is, franchisees do not ordinarily seek managerial
control over their franchisor. In fact, one of the benefits purchased by
the franchisee is the franchisor's expertise. The typical franchise arrange-
ment simply puts into practice the principle that specialization of labor
generally generates greater economic efficiency. The effect of a rule
creating a security out of an ordinary franchise is to raise the costs of
specialization and thus inhibit efficient allocation of resources.
This concept of managerial control can also be shown to demonstrate
logical consequences that its proponents would never knowingly accept.
If the franchisee has managerial control over the franchisor's operations,
then the franchise is not a security. Accordingly, the registration and
antifraud provisions of the securities laws are avoided. By analogy, is
the common stock owned by the president of General Motors Corpora-
tion any less a security because it is held by a person who has managerial
control over the operations of the firm? One can readily imagine the
response of the Securities and Exchange Commission if GM's president
attempted to sell his stock in violation of the registration and antifraud
provisions of the securities laws.
In some states, the advocates of "investor protection" have not
been content to let the courts expand the definition of "security" as
19731
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described above. For example, the Oklahoma legislature recently enacted
a revision of its statutory definition of "security" to include certain
multi-level distributorships and, additionally, to reflect an extremely
broad version of the "risk capital" theory." To illustrate, the Oklahoma
definition of "risk capital" seems to include an employment arrangement
if the promoter of the venture does not have the capital to pay for the
employee's services as they are performed but promises some later benefit
(cash payment or some other benefit), provided the employee has no
direct control over the investment or policy decisions of the venture.
Under the definition, the employee's services are deemed an investment.
To put it another way, an investment of human capital may spell security
under some circumstances.
The Oklahoma language defining multi-level distributorships as
securities is also very broad. In this connection, the statute exempts
from the definition of "security" those distributorships that the Oklahoma
Securities Administrator may exclude because "public interest" or "pro-
tection of investors" does not, in the Administrator's opinion (no other
standards are provided in the statute),, warrant such regulation. It is not
difficult to predict the kind of lobbying that may result from such a
provision-the larger, more affluent persons lobbying for an exclusion
from the definition, and the smaller, newer promoters being unable to
compete for such an exemption. The social costs of such legislation
seem high indeed. As we observed earlier, a McDonalds will not be
adversely affected; such firms will in fact be benefited.
In essence, the Oklahoma legislature has made a merit judgment
that certain franchises, multi-level distributorships and pyramid promo-
tions need regulation under the securities laws. Accordingly, in the wake
of complaints and suits surrounding the Glenn Turner and similar enter-
prises, a statute was enacted ensuring such regulation. Many state courts
have made the same kind of merit judgment when they have expanded
the definition of "security." Such judicial judgments, while generating
high social costs that have already been mentioned, are not inconsistent
with the merit approach generally underlying state securities regulation.
Merit standards are not, however, part of the theoretical fabric of
the federal securities laws. Nevertheless, recently the federal district
court of Oregon speciously reasoned that the "risk capital" theories of
California, Oregon and Hawaii could be appropriate tests for determin-
ing what is "commonly known as a security" under that catchall phrase
contained in the federal definition of "security."8 In effect, the court held
that because a financing device was a security under a few state decisions,
it automatically became a security under federal law, despite the differ-
ence in regulatory philosophy between state and federal law. The court
7. Okla. L. 1973, H.B. 1035 [2 BLue SiY L. REP. 39,102 (June 19, 1973)].
8. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 D. Ore. 1972), af'd,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S.Ct. 117 (1973).
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also stressed the essential managerial test developed by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii thus again drawing on state judicial pronouncements.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court of Oregon holding,9 but was silent regarding the lower court's
reasoning regarding state concepts of "risk capital." In support of its
affirmance, the appellate court offered a rationale that the Howey test
should not be applied mechanically. It stated that "[r]egardless of the
fact that the purchaser here must contribute something besides his
money, the essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise are ...not his own."'" Essentially, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Supreme Court's solely standard in Howey should not be
taken literally. This policy decision may have been based on the Ninth
Circuit's reaction to the facts of the case before it. Witness this sentence
from the first paragraph of the court's opinion: "The trial court's find-
ings, which are fully supported by the record, demonstrate that defen-
dants' scheme is a gigantic and successful fraud."" Unfortunately that
case, and others like it, may be demonstrating the truth of the old maxim
that hard cases make bad law.
Shortly after the District Court of Oregon rendered its opinion,
suit was filed under virtually identical facts (and by the same plaintiff-
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission) in another
federal district court (Northern Dist. of Georgia). The Georgia court
found that the financing device was not a security."2 With respect to
the question of whether an "investment contract" was involved, the court
refused to depart from the solely test of Howey: "This district court sees
no freedom to coin a new, different and more expansive standard in light
of these binding higher court decisions." 13 In connection with the "com-
monly known" argument on which the Oregon federal court relied, the
Georgia decision recognized that while there was an emerging philosophi-
cal trend to incorporate the "risk capital" theory into the body of securi-
ties law, an emerging trend and "commonly known" are quite different.
Furthermore, how many state court decisions adopting the "risk capital"
theory are sufficient to justify a conclusion that business devices falling
within the concept are "commonly known" as securities? Do we count
the jurisdictions adopting and rejecting "risk capital" and make our deci-
sions accordingly? And is that technique a proper standard at all for
determining whether a plan is "commonly known" as a security? In
any event, there are really only a few jurisdictions that have adopted the
"risk capital" concept, and the Georgia federal court perceived that fact.
9. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
10. Id. at 483.
11. Id. at 478.
12. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal
docketed. No. 73-2339, 5th Cir., May 4, 1973.
13. Id. at 592.
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Thus, some courts have been unwilling to make policy decisions regard-
ing the need for regulation and to then expand the law by adopting
convenient, albeit not consistent, rationale.
While "consumerism" is not new to securities regulation, it has been
a significant force in the expansion of such regulation, both with respect
to the quantity of regulation and the kind of interests subjected to
regulation. If members of the public are damaged by virtue of some kind
of business activity, it is natural for them to complain; and if their
complaints can be transformed into legal action, it is understandable
that they will pursue this course, particularly if their cause is politically
popular and if government agencies stand ready, equipped with public
funds, to assist the hapless victims. Unless the targets of such action
are heavily financed and well organized politically, it will be particularly
difficult for them to resist an attack mounted under the banner of "con-
sumerism" (or "investor protection" in the case of securities regulation).
In the securities area, the government agency bringing a suit for injunc-
tive relief can simply outlast many targets, especially if they are
"Johnny-come-latelies." From the cases and administrative releases, it
is apparent that the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as
many state administrators, has jumped on the bandwagon seeking in-
junctions on the basis of an expanded definition of "security." Unhappily,
the administrators and some of the courts have not examined the social
costs generated by their desire to protect the investing public.
